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521 
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY OF CLINICAL 
TRIAL DATA IN THE UNITED STATES AND  
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
I. THE STATUS OF CLINICAL TRIALS DATA 
The Internet is becoming “the greatest source of health information” 
for most consumers, which reinforces the importance of making online 
information about clinical trials accessible in a reliable, unbiased format.
1
 
Non-reporting and distorted reporting of clinical trials impede the 
betterment of scientific knowledge and public health.
2
 Therefore, proper 
reporting of clinical trial results on the Internet is an essential step to 
ensure the research community and providers “. . . fully understand the 
benefits . . . [and] potential consequences of taking a certain drug.”3 
There have been increasing demands for public transparency, such as 
the Declaration of Helsinki, which states the need for complete disclosure 
of clinical trial data.
4
 Clinical trial data is research meant to “contribute to 
generalizable knowledge” as set forth in the Belmont Report,
5
 and the 
research community has an obligation to share that data with trial 
participants.
6
 Hoarding data will cause researchers to “duplicate efforts, 
 
 
 1.  James M. Wood & Roxanne M. Gariby, Hoarding Away Science: Towards a More 
Transparent View of Health and Online Registries for Independent Postmarket Drug Research, 60 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 547, 548 (2005).  
 2. See generally World Health Organization (WHO), WHO Calls for Increased Transparency in 
Medical Research (2015), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2015/medical-research-
transparency/en/. 
 3. Wood & Gariby, supra note 1, at 548. The 2010 Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials 
(CONSORT) Statement has motivated the international community to “[improve] the reporting quality 
for . . . trials.” Kenneth F. Schulz et al., CONSORT 2010 Statement: Updated Guidelines For 
Reporting Parallel Group Randomised Trials, 340 BMJ 698, 698 (2010), http://www.consort-
statement.org/Media/Default/Downloads/CONSORT%202010%20Statement/CONSORT%202010%2
0Statement%20-%20BMJ.pdf. 
 4.  The Declaration of Helsinki, World Medical Association (WMA), http://www.wma.net/en/ 
30publications/10policies/b3/ (last updated in October 2013). The Declaration of Helsinki states that 
“[r]esearchers have a duty to make publicly available the results of their research on human subjects 
and are accountable for the completeness and accuracy of their reports.” Id. ¶ 36. 
 5.  Leonard A. Levin & Julie G. Palmer, Institutional Review Boards Should Require Clinical 
Trial Registration, 167 JAMA 1576, 1577 (2007) (citing The Belmont Report (1979), Part A, available 
at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html)). This report differentiates “. . . 
clinical practice and research: ‘[P]ractice’ refers to interventions that are designed solely to enhance 
the well-being of an individual patient . . . ’[R]esearch’ designates an activity designed to test an 
hypothesis . . . and . . . develop[s] or contribute[s] to generalizable knowledge . . . .” Id.  
 6. Kathy L. Hudson & Francis S. Collins, Sharing and Reporting the Results of Clinical Trials, 
313 JAMA 355, 355–56 (2015). In 2003, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) expressed support for 
the concept of data sharing. Id. The NIH said data sharing was “essential for expedited translation of 
research results into knowledge, products, and procedures to improve human health.” Elizabeth Loder, 
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repeat mistakes, and potentially cause avoidable injuries or deaths to 
research subjects.”
7
 Changes in the administration of clinical trials is 
necessary to safeguard public health and maximize effective use of clinical 
trial data.
8
 A possible reform is inclusion of independent entities in the 
process currently dominated by pharmaceutical companies who sponsor, 
fund, and conduct their own clinical trials.
9
 The present arrangement 
makes it possible for these companies to publish trial results that favor the 
company’s product and suppress results that are unfavorable.
10
 Glenis 
Willmott, an advocate of the new European Union (EU) clinical trials 
legislation, contends, “When a patient makes the decision to take part in a 
clinical trial, they do so to help advance medicine, to improve treatment 
. . . They do not do it to help a particular company promote a particular 
drug.”
11
 People have a “right to health” and a critical element of the right 
to health is “shared public access to clinical trials data.”
12
  
Since the funds for many clinical trials are supplied by drug 
manufacturers, who in turn receive large public subsidies, clinical trial 
data should be considered a “public good”
13
 Yet drug manufacturers 
continue to assert ownership and proprietary rights to clinical trial data 
including clinical study reports (CSRs). They classify CSRs as a trade 
 
 
Sharing Data From Clinical Trials: Where We Are and What Lies Ahead, 347 BMJ (2013), available 
at http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f4794. 
 7.  Levin & Palmer, supra note 5, at 1577.  
 8.  Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical Trials to Test Drugs: The Neglected Reform, 6 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113 (2013). Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Access to Patient-Level Trial 
Data—A Boon to Drug Developers, 369 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1577, 1578 (2013). 
 9.  Rodwin, supra note 8. An-Wen Chan et al., SPIRIT 2013 Explanation and Elaboration: 
Guidance for Protocols of Clinical Trials, 346 BMJ 6 (2013), http://www.bmj.com/content/ 
346/bmj.e7586.  
 10.  Thomas Bodenheimer, Conflict of Interest in Clinical Drug Trials: A Risk Factor for 
Scientific Misconduct (Aug. 15, 2000), http://archive.hhs.gov/ohrp/coi/bodenheimer.htm. Therefore, 
“most journals insist on any declaration of conflict of interest—financial or otherwise.” Peter Fayers 
and David Machin, Randomized Clinical Trials Design, Practice and Reporting (2010), 205. For 
further discussion, see Gisela Schott et al., The Financing of Drug Trials by Pharmaceutical 
Companies and its Consequences, 107 DTSCH. ARZTEBL. INT. (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC2868984/. 
 11.  Press Release, Glenis Willmott, Local MEP Leads Drug Trial Transparency Drive (Apr. 2, 
2013), http://www.gleniswillmott.eu/local-mep-leads-drug-trial-transparency-drive/. 
 12.  Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health: The 
Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 65, 89 (2012). “The public 
needs the information to hold federal authorities accountable for regulatory decisions, and patients 
need access to the data to help make informed decisions.” Marc A. Rodwin & John D. Abramson, 
Clinical Trial Data as a Public Good, 308 JAMA 871, 872 (2012), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/ 
article.aspx?articleid=1356362&resultClick=3. 
 13.  Rodwin & Abramson, supra note 12, at 872. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking 
the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public 
Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2009).  
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secret
14
 and argue a policy of CSR release advantages the competition.
15
 
Even if this was the case, “patent laws and exclusive marketing periods 
protect the sponsor’s investment.”
16
 In fact, such protections may have a 
detrimental impact on consumers by placing affordable drugs beyond their 
reach.
17
 More openness could help improve the image of drug companies; 
there have been calls to ban industry-sponsored research.
18
 
 
 
 14.  Rodwin & Abramson, supra note 12, at 872. Though manufacturers argue CSRs are 
proprietary, “[p]hysicians need access to such data to practice evidence-based medicine. Medical 
facilities and insurers need complete trial data to decide whether . . . to include a drug in their 
formularies.” Id. CSRs are “documents produced by study sponsors primarily for drug regulators. 
They run to many hundreds or thousands of pages, comprising substantially more information about a 
trial than journal articles and providing relatively unbiased material for evidence synthesis.” Peter 
Doshi et al., Clinical Trial Data: Get Them While You Can, 348 BMJ (2014), http://www.bmj.com/ 
content/348/bmj.g63. 
 15.  Rodwin & Abramson, supra note 12, at 872. Competitors do, in fact, make up a majority of 
CSR requests to the EMA, which suggests that CSRs may contain proprietary information. Michelle 
Mello et al., Preparing for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data, 369 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1651, 
1653–54 (2013), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMhle1309073.  
 16.  Rodwin & Abramson, supra note 12, at 872. Patent protection covers the development 
period of new drugs and “when the patents or other periods of exclusivity on brand-name drugs expire, 
manufacturers can apply to the FDA to sell generic versions.” How Drugs are Developed and 
Approved, FDA (last updated in Nov. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval 
Process/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/. Mello observes that early disclosure of clinical trial 
data could result in patent law issues including a “prior art” barrier, a “shorter exclusivity period,” 
competitors filing a patent application before the inventor, or “higher risk of denial” of a patent 
application. Mello et al., supra note 15, at 1654.  
 17. Dean Baker, The Benefits and Savings From Publicly Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription 
Drugs, Center for Economic and Policy Research (2008), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ 
clinicaltrials_2008_03.pdf. Drug companies argue current patent protection and exclusivity periods are 
not sufficient to boost drug development as the process of “drug discovery [is] difficult, expensive and 
time consuming.” Josh Bloom & Els Torreele, Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to 
Encourage Innovation? WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529 
70204542404577156993191655000. See generally Dana Goldman et al., The Benefits from Giving 
Makers of Conventional ‘Small Molecule’ Drugs Longer Exclusivity Over Clinical Trial Data, 30 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 84–90 (2011), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/1/84.full.html. Avik Roy 
also sees the need for change in the system, stating the “nation’s system for drug approval discourages 
innovation and investment . . . [due to] the high cost of Phase III clinical trials, which are required for 
FDA approval of most drugs.” Avik S.A. Roy, Stifling New Cures: The True Cost of Lengthy Clinical 
Drug Trials, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (Apr. 2012), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/ 
html/fda_05.htm.  
 18.  Richard Smith et al., Should Journals Stop Publishing Research Funded by the Drug 
Industry?, 348 BMJ (2014), http://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g171. Trish Groves notes that BMJ 
“recently banned submissions of research partly or wholly funded by the tobacco industry.” Id. 
However, she points out, “[t]he drug and tobacco industries, notwithstanding the inescapable fact that 
both are out to make money, have very different aims. The drug industry makes and sells products 
aimed at improving health . . . The tobacco industry, meanwhile, makes and sells products that harm 
health.” Id. 
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Given the climate of public distrust toward “Big Pharma,”
19
 clinical 
data transparency is becoming a higher priority item on the agenda of the 
international community.
20
 Part II of this Note provides specifics on the 
recent developments propelling clinical trial registration and reporting. 
Part III covers the FDA’s stance on clinical trial disclosure in the U.S. Part 
IV explains the EMA’s initiative to increase transparency in the EU’s 
newly passed Clinical Trials Regulation. Part V focuses on public release 
of CSRs. Part VI sets forth proposed models for access to clinical trial data 
that address issues of patient privacy and proprietary information. Part VII 
discusses the need to strike a balance between the conflicting interests of 
drug manufacturers and public health proponents.  
II. REPORTING AND REGISTRATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS 
Access to health data, clinical trials in particular, is a growing concern 
among consumers since some pharmaceutical companies develop drugs 
with no more benefit than drugs currently on the market and even fail to 
adequately disclose drug use risks.
21
 Big Pharma has faced hefty fines for 
withholding negative findings from clinical trials, but the fines imposed do 
not seem to constitute sufficient deterrence.
22
 Such incidents indicate a 
more exacting framework is needed to discourage selective reporting. 
In 2006, international attention centered on trial registration when the 
World Health Organization (WHO) established the International Clinical 
Trial Registry Platform (ICTRP).
23
 Regrettably, the ICTRP did not include 
 
 
 19.  Big Pharma refers to “the world’s vast and influential pharmaceutical industry and its trade 
and lobbying group, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America or PhRMA.” Drug 
Watch, Big Pharma, http://www.drugwatch.com/manufacturer/. For the purposes of this Note, the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) is included. 
 20. Erosion of public trust is one of the common reasons cited in support of transparency. Judy 
Stone, Why Transparency and Data Sharing in Clinical Trials Matters, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/judystone/2015/01/15/why-transparency-and-data-sharing-in-clinical-
trials-matters/. 
 21. Baker, supra note 17.  
 22. Patricia M. Tereskerz, Clinical Research and the Law (2012), 87. For instance, in 2004, 
Merck recalled Vioxx after it was revealed it downplayed cardiovascular risks discovered during 
clinical trials. Merck and other Big Pharma companies have faced lawsuits and reached high dollar 
settlements. Tereskerz, supra note 21, at 94–95. Pfizer was tagged with a $1.2 billion criminal fine 
when it tried to shift liability for fraud to its shell company. Tereskerz, supra note 21, at 89. 
Pharmaceutical companies are unfazed by such fines because they “view such fines as merely a cost of 
doing business. . . .” Kevin Outterson, Punishing Health Care Fraud—Is the GSK Settlement 
Sufficient?, 367 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1082–85 (2012). For more information on this issue, see Drug 
Watch, supra note 19.  
 23. Kay Dickersin & Drummond Rennie, The Evolution of Trial Registries and Their Use to 
Assess the Clinical Trial Enterprise, 307 JAMA 1861 (2012), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/9
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a means of enforcement.
24
 Not long afterward, improvements in trial 
protocols and design were considered to address “biased reporting of 
outcomes within studies,” a correlative problem to “biased reporting of 
whole studies.”
25
 
The U.S. was the first to enact clinical trials transparency legislation 
and Europe followed shortly thereafter.
26
 Congress mandated trial 
registration on a public database (ClinicalTrials.gov)
27
 in the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).
28
 The 
European Parliament required registration on a European database 
(European Union Drug Regulating Authorities Clinical Trials 
(EudraCT))
29
 in the Clinical Trials Directive (Directive 2001/20/EC).
30
 In 
2009, the move toward transparency accelerated when Peter Doshi 
uncovered data on the limited efficacy of the anti-flu drug Tamiflu and 
began pushing for release of clinical trial data.
31
  
In order to ensure published clinical trials contain correct and updated 
information, health care professionals need direct access to CSRs, not 
 
 
aspx?articleid=1150078. See generally World Health Organization (WHO), About Registries, 
http://www.who.int/ictrp/network/trds/en/index.html.  
 24.  Lemmens & Telfer, supra note 12, at 73.  
 25.  Silvio Garattini & Iain Chalmers, Patients and the Public Deserve Big Changes in 
Evaluation of Drugs, 338 BMJ 804, 805 (2009). See An-Wen Chan et al., supra note 9. See generally 
Heidi Ledford, Translational Research: 4 Ways to Fix the Clinical Trial, 477 NATURE 526–28 (2011), 
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110928/full/477526a.html.  
 26. Lemmens & Telfer, supra note 12, at 71.  
 27.  Kathy Thomas et al., Clinical Trial Disclosure: Global Overview and Implications of New 
Laws and Guidelines, 44 DRUG INFO. J. 213, 214 (2010), http://dij.sagepub.com/content/44/3/213. 
full.pdf+html.  
 28. Pub. L. No. 105–115, 111 Stat 2296 (1997). FDA, Guidance for Industry, Information 
Program on Clinical Trials for Serious or Life-Threatening Diseases and Conditions (2002), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126838.pdf.  
 29. Charlotte Haug et al., Registries and Registration of Clinical Trials, 353 N. ENGL. J. MED. 
2811 (2005), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe058280.  
 30. Thomas et al., supra note 27, at 213. See generally European Commission, Directive 
2001/20/EC (“Clinical Trials Directive”) (Apr. 4, 2001), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:121:0034:0044:en:PDF. 
 31.  Katie Thomas, Breaking the Seal on Drug Research, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/business/breaking-the-seal-on-drug-research.html?_r=0&pagewanted= 
all. In 2009, the Cochrane Collaboration, working with Peter Doshi, began investigating the efficacy of 
Tamiflu. Id. While they were investigating, Keiji Hayashi, an outside party, discovered that “only two 
of [the ten clinical trials in the Kaiser study] had been fully published in medical journals.” Id. The 
British Medical Journal conducted their own investigation, which showed that Roche used 
ghostwriters to portray positive data about Tamiflu. Id. Following the Tamiflu controversy, Roche 
pledged to “release detailed clinical data to outside researchers, upon request.” Id. See generally 
Laurent Kaiser et al., Impact of oseltamivir Treatment on Influenza-Related Lower Respiratory Tract 
Complications and Hospitalizations, 163 JAMA 1667 (2003), http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article. 
aspx?articleid=215903. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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merely the filtered data of CSRs presented in journal articles;
32
 however, 
transparency presents risks when taken to the extreme and should be 
pursued in a balanced manner.
33
 If transparency is taken to the extreme, 
the “‘seen’ error of approving new medicines” may result in the “‘unseen’ 
error of blocking new medicines.”
34
 
Drug manufacturers present the greatest opposition to registration and 
reporting of clinical trials data.
35
 They argue trial registration may provide 
competitors access to confidential information.
36
 Therefore, some drug 
manufacturers argue that incentives, such as protection from mass tort 
litigation, should be exchanged for disclosure.
37
 Though the need to foster 
a competitive environment in science is important, it is equally important 
to hold trial sponsors accountable for the accuracy of their clinical 
research in order to promote public confidence in drugs based on that 
research.   
 
 
 32.  Peter Doshi et al., Restoring Invisible and Abandoned Trials: A Call for People to Publish 
the Findings, 346 BMJ (2013), http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f2865. Peter Doshi calls for 
correction and republication of abandoned trials. Id. at 2. He calls this concept “restoring invisible and 
abandoned trials (RIAT).” Id. 
 33.  Scott Lassman, Sequestered Science: The Consequences of Undisclosed Knowledge. 
Transparency and Innuendo: An Alternative to Reactive Overdisclosure, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
69, 70 (2006).  
The problem of too little transparency—failure to communicate known risks about a drug 
product—can cause serious harm to the public health . . . However, the premature 
communication of “preliminary” safety information also entails serious public health risks, 
since physicians and patients may make health care decisions based upon information that 
later turns out to be wrong. This is the problem of too much transparency. 
Id. at 76. Too much transparency may also result in unnecessary litigation and jeopardize proprietary 
information. Mark J. Scheineson and M. Lynn Sykes, Major New Initiatives Require Increased 
Disclosure of Clinical Trial Information, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 525 (2005). 
 34.  Roy, supra note 17.  
 35.  Lemmens & Telfer, supra note 12, at 77. See generally Drummond Rennie, Trial 
Registration: A Great Idea Switches from Ignored to Irresistible, 292 JAMA 1359 (2004).  
 36.  Lemmens & Telfer, supra note 12, at 79–81. Lemmens and Telfer argue that there are other 
ways this confidential information could be obtained such as “[s]creening patent applications” and 
“general competitive intelligence.” Id. at 81. The data required to be posted in a clinical trial registry 
may be voluntarily disclosed by the research subjects. Levin and Palmer, supra note 7, at 1579. See 
generally Trudo Lemmens & Ron Bouchard, Mandatory Clinical Trial Registration: Rebuilding Trust 
in Medical Research, 4 GLOBAL FORUM UPDATE ON RESEARCH FOR HEALTH 40–42 (2007). 
 37.  DrugBaron, Clinical Trial Transparency: Time for Some Carrot as Well as More Stick 
(2013), http://www.tcpinnovations.com/drugbaron/clinical-trial-transparency/. DrugBaron suggests 
that the state should take on some responsibility for potential damage caused by a drug if drug 
companies voluntarily disclose data. Id. While this is not a practicable solution, examples like 
Medtronic shed light on why drug companies are reluctant to embrace transparency. See generally 
discussion of Medtronic in Laura DeFrancesco, Behind Closed Doors, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
528, 529 (2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015] INCREASING TRANSPARENCY OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 527 
 
 
 
 
III. CLINICAL DRUG TRIALS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE FDA’S STANCE 
ON DISCLOSURE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 
Many drug manufacturers tend to selectively disclose data to ensure the 
commercial success of their drugs, resulting in drug scandals.
38
 These 
scandals are complicated by the fact that some of the research studies 
relied upon are, in fact, “seeding trials.”
39
 Such studies “endanger human 
subjects” but fly under the radar of public knowledge.
40
 Though 
institutional review boards (IRBs) serve as a safeguard, they do not check 
whether the studies they evaluate are seeding trials and their financial ties 
to the pharmaceutical industry may affect their evaluations.
41
 The conflicts 
of interest manifest in clinical research and drug development bring to 
mind “the ancient question ‘Who guards the guardians?’”42 
Independent scrutiny of clinical trials is critical and must be paired 
with legislation that promotes transparency of such trials and access to the 
drugs tested by those trials. To facilitate access, Congress passed the 
Improving Access to Clinical Trials Act in 2010
43
 and introduced in 2012 
the Transforming the Regulatory Environment to Accelerate Access to 
Treatments (TREAT) Act, which was ultimately not enacted.
44
 To 
 
 
 38.  Brandon Powell, Silence is Not the Best Medicine: Requiring Disclosure of Clinical Trial 
Data for Abandoned Drugs, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 571, 586–87 (2012). The profit motive of pharma 
companies creates inefficiencies as more money is allocated to developing lifestyle drugs rather than 
drugs like antibiotics. Id.  
 39.  Carl Elliott, Useless Studies, Real Harm, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/07/29/opinion/useless-pharmaceutical-studies-real-harm.html?_r=0. “The purpose of 
seeding trials is not to advance research but to make doctors familiar with a new drug.” Id. Such trials 
are not subject to strict regulation by the FDA as “seeding trials are not illegal, and the drugs in 
question have already received F.D.A. approval.” Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. “[M]any I.R.B.’s are now themselves for-profit businesses, paid directly by the sponsors 
of the studies they evaluate . . . If one I.R.B. gets a reputation for being too strict, a pharmaceutical 
company can simply go elsewhere for its review.” Id. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Should 
Society Allow Research Ethics Boards to Be Run As For-Profit Enterprises?, 3 PLOS MED (2006), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030309. Drug Watch, supra 
note 19. Like I.R.B.s, the FDA’s budget derives largely from user fees paid by drug manufacturers. 
Cozy Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/cozy-
deal.html?_r=0. Perhaps “the best approach would be for the government to fully finance the FDA.” 
Id. 
 42. Richard A. Epstein, How Conflict-of-Interest Rules Endanger Medical Progress and Cures, 
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (2010), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/fda_03.htm.  
 43. Rare Diseases Clinical Research Network, President Signs “Improving Access to Clinical 
Trials Act” into Law, (2010), https://www.rarediseasesnetwork.org/spotlight/december2010/clinical 
trialsact.htm. This Act “enable[d] patients with rare diseases to participate in clinical trials without 
losing eligibility for public healthcare benefits.” Id. S. 1674 (2010). 
 44. Roy, supra note 17. The lengthy FDA drug approval process is problematic for patients 
seeking “access to new medical treatments.” Id. TREAT allows drugs to reach the market faster but 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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encourage transparency, Congress required posting of summary trial 
results on the Clinicaltrials.gov database in the 2007 Food and Drug 
Administration Amendment Acts (FDAAA);
45
 however, the FDAAA 
contained exemptions for trials of drugs based on phase and approval 
status.
46
 Its effect in increasing reporting was short-term,
47
 resulting in 
efforts to pass the 2012 Trial and Experimental Studies (TEST) Act.
48
 The 
TEST Act was more expansive in scope,
49
 but the bill was not enacted and 
was reintroduced as H.R. 2031 in 2013 to bring “the U.S. closer toward 
reforms now underway in the EU.”50  
Though the TEST Act stalled, transparency remained at the forefront of 
the FDA’s agenda as seen in its actions in 2014 to make available 
 
 
whether the faster approval times meet requisite safety criteria is another issue. Avik Roy, How Big 
Pharma Undermined Medical Innovation for Financial Gain, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/02/15/how-big-pharma-undermined-medical-innovation-for-
financial-gain/. S.2113 is available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2113. Another bill, 
H.R. 6, which addresses accelerates drug approval, is currently being considered. Adam Schank, 
BGOV Bill Summary: H.R. 6, FDA Treatment Approvals and NIH Policy, 13 PLIR 1000 (2015). On a 
related note, patients with life-threatening diseases can use the “Compassionate Use” or “Expanded 
Access” exemption to access new drugs that have not yet been approved. William Hudson, In Cancer 
Drug Battle, Both Sides Appeal to Ethics, CNN (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/28/ 
health/compassionate-drug-use/. See also Kate Whitfield et al., Compassionate Use of Interventions: 
Results of A European Clinical Research Infrastructures Network (ECRIN) Survey Of Ten European 
Countries, 11 TRIALS (2010), http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/11/1/104.  
 45.  FDA, FDA’s Role: ClinicalTrials.gov Information, http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/ 
SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/FDAsRoleClinicalTrials.govInformation/default.htm. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 282(j) (2007). FDAAA 801 Requirements, http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/manage-recs/fdaaa. Thomas, 
supra note 27, at 214. Deborah Zarin et al., The Proposed Rule for U.S. Clinical Trial Registration and 
Results Submission, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 174, 177 (2015), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/ 
NEJMsr1414226#t=article. 
 46. Thomas et al., supra note 27, at 217. Hudson & Collins, supra note 6. Specifically, Phase I 
drugs, unapproved drugs, and drugs on the market before 2007 were exempted. Id. Erick Turner et al., 
Closing a Loophole in the FDA Amendments Act, 322 SCI 44–46 (2008), http://www.sciencemag. 
org/content/322/5898/44.3.full. 
 47. Michael R. Law et al., Despite Law, Fewer Than One in Eight Completed Studies of Drugs 
and Biologics Are Reported on Time on ClinicalTrials.gov, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2338 (2011), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/12/2338.full.html.  
 48.  Jeffrey M. Drazen, Transparency for Clinical Trials—The TEST Act, 367 N. ENGL. J. MED. 
863 (2012), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe1209433.  
 49.  Id. at 863. The TEST Act mandated reporting for “[trials]. . ., regardless of phase . . . or 
approval status” and for “trial(s) that could be used to support an application for FDA approval.” Id. 
H.R. 6272 is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr6272ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr 
6272ih.pdf. 
 50.  Alexander Gaffney, US Would See Clinical Trials Reporting Transparency Under New 
Legislation, RAPS (May 17, 2013). “The bill has . . . only 1% chance of being enacted most likely 
because there are not enough active supporters . . . “ Ilana Logvinov, Clinical trials transparency and 
the Trial and Experimental Studies Transparency (TEST) Act, 27 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 219, 
220 (2014). H.R. 2031 is available at https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr2031/BILLS-113hr2031 
ih.pdf.  
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“demographic subgroup data[.]”
51
 The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) continued the transparency initiative by issuing a “Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).”
52
 The most significant change 
proposed in the NPRM is the requirement “to submit summary results to 
include trials of unapproved . . . products.”
53
 A secondary proposal by the 
NIH suggests registration and reporting for all NIH-funded trials 
“regardless of study phase, type of intervention, or whether they are 
subject to the FDAAA requirements;”
54
 however, as Jennifer Miller, a 
fellow at the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University, observes, the 
impact of these initiatives may be limited since “oversight and 
enforcement by the FDA . . . is weak.”
55
 
Moreover, in the drug evaluation process, the FDA gives drug 
manufacturers great leeway when it comes to determining the parameters 
of release for “confidential commercial information (CCI),”
56
 which is 
often “information relating to risk and benefit” of a new drug.
57
 Currently, 
the FDA approval process includes safeguards such as advisory 
committees and “approval contingent upon the sponsor’s conducting of 
post-marketing studies.”58 Even with these measures in place, it remains 
difficult to ascertain the risks and actual clinical efficacy of drugs in 
 
 
 51.  FDA Report, FDA Action Plan To Enhance The Collection And Availability Of 
Demographic Subgroup Data (Aug. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/ 
Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDASIA
/UCM410474.pdf. This initiative is in response to “Section 907 of the 2012 Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA).” Id. at 1. 
 52.  NIH News Release, HHS and NIH Take Steps to Enhance Transparency of Clinical Trial 
Results (2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/nov2014/od-19.htm.  
 53.  NIH News Release, supra note 52. Sara Reardon, U.S. Government Cracks Down on 
Clinical Trials Reporting, NATURE (2014). 
 54.  Zarin, supra note 45, at 175. See generally Hudson & Collins, supra note 6.  
 55.  Ed Silverman, What Happens When Results Data From Clinical Trials Goes Missing? 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2014). The NIH and FDA have the power to impose penalties for noncompliance 
(for example, the NIH “can withhold grant money, while the FDA can levy a $10,000-a-day civil 
penalty for trials that aren’t registered or results that aren’t reported”) but they rarely exercise such 
authority Id.  
 56.  DeFrancesco, supra note 37, at 528. DeFrancesco refers to CCI as CBI (confidential 
business information) but I will use CCI. Drug manufacturers often argue that clinical trial data 
constitutes CCI. Id. at 529. Indefiniteness as to what constitutes CCI has made data release difficult 
even with “challenge[s] from Public Citizen.” Id. at 535. The recalcitrance of the pharmaceutical 
industry in withholding clinical trial data leads to “incomplete, biased . . . clinical evidence,” which, in 
turn, leads to doctors “mak[ing] misguided prescription decisions;” the need for this data in medical 
literature is paramount but it should be weighed against the threat of competitive harm that 
accompanies data release. Id. 
 57.  Id. at 529.  
 58. Peter Lurie & Allison Zieve, Sometimes the Silence Can Be Like the Thunder: Access to 
Pharmaceutical Data at the FDA, 69 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 85, 88–89 (2006).  
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clinical trials due to sponsor control. Should the industry retain input in the 
process, independent experts must be given the dominant role.
59
 
Alternatively, in order to ensure drugs meet the requisite criteria before 
approval, the federal government can sponsor its own independent clinical 
trials
60
 or Congress can pass legislation that requires independent 
contractors in the private sector to carry out clinical trials testing (that 
encompasses New Drug Applications (NDAs), post-marketing trials, and 
seeding trials) and submit those results to the FDA for further review.
61
 
The past record on expansive transparency legislation suggests it would 
face difficulties in passage. Still, such measures may help reverse the 
current retreat from transparency.
62
 
IV. REFORMING CLINICAL DRUG TRIAL LEGISLATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: THE EMA’S NEW POLICY ON TRANSPARENCY 
Like the FDA, the European Medicine Agency (EMA)
63
 expressed 
commitment to trial transparency but has been mired in issues relating to 
drug access, lack of compliance with trial reporting requirements, sponsor 
control of trial data, and conflicts of interest. The EU experiences longer 
delays in drug approval than the U.S. due to the separation of “the 
scientific approval process” (handled by the EMA) and “the marketing 
approval process” (handled by the European Commission (EC)).64 Also, 
the EMA prioritizes market considerations over scientific criteria like 
safety and efficacy during the evaluation process,
65
 since it “is answerable 
 
 
 59. Independent experts would be ideal but the FDA does sometimes waive conflict of interest 
issues to obtain individuals with the necessary expertise for its advisory committees. Epstein, supra 
note 42.  
 60. Rodwin, supra note 8, at 162. To avoid the problem of “having the same agency both 
conduct . . . and evaluate . . . trials,” the NIH and FDA could take on the separate functions or “the 
FDA [could] evaluate research conducted by private contractors,” which have been carefully chosen 
by a separate agency. Id.  
 61. Id. at 164–65. 
 62. DeFrancesco, supra note 37, at 529. In recent years, there has been increased CCI protection 
of trial data in regulatory documents, which can be attributed to the increased pressure on the FDA by 
brand manufacturers seeking to protect their trial data from “generic and biosimilar competition.” Id. 
 63.  European Medicines Agency (EMA), Central Authorization of Medicines, http://www.ema. 
europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/about_us/general/general_content_000109.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0
580028a47. The EMA reviews applications for marketing authorization in the EU and European 
Economic Area, which is granted or denied by the European Commission. Id. 
 64. Lynn J. Howie et al., A Comparison of FDA and EMA Drug Approval: Implications for Drug 
Development and Cost of Care, ONCOLOGY J. (2013), http://www.cancernetwork.com/oncology-
journal/comparison-fda-and-ema-drug-approval-implications-drug-development-and-cost-care#sthash. 
CAp0f6HQ.dpuf. 
 65.  Ernst R. Berndt et al., Opportunities for Improving the Drug Development Process: Results 
from a Survey of Industry and the FDA, 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 91, 101 (2006). 
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to the [EU] Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry” and this 
department promotes the view that “drugs should be seen as consumer 
goods rather than as agents for promoting and protecting health.”66 Such a 
structure has helped drug companies exercise great control “in evaluating 
[their] own products.”67 
Recognizing the drawbacks of the system, the EMA implemented 
measures for increased transparency, including making clinical trial data 
more readily available in the EU by introducing EudraCT, the counterpart 
to ClinicalTrials.gov, in 2004.
68
 The EudraCT database includes trials 
with “at least one site in the EU or EEA” although participants are 
typically recruited outside this area.
69
 In November 2013, the EMA 
updated EudraCT, allowing sponsors to upload summary results that 
would “be made publicly available through the EU Clinical Trials Register 
(EU CTR).”
70
 The change in EudraCT’s results reporting approach brings 
 
 
However, recent data shows that the EMA is approving drug applications at a higher rate and may 
even start outpacing the U.S. Hamilton Moses III et al., The Anatomy of Medical Research: U.S. and 
International Comparisons, 313 JAMA 174, 181 (2015) 
 66. Garratini & Chalmers, supra note 25, at 804. A solution they propose to make the process 
more transparent and beneficial for patients is to “transfer. . . responsibility for drug licensing and 
evaluation to the EU Directororate General for Health and Consumers Affairs.” Id. at 805. 
 67. Garratini & Chalmers, supra note 25, at 805. They argue that there should be more 
“[i]ndependent clinical research to evaluate new drugs” so drug companies cannot hide negative 
results. Id. 
 68.  Thomas, supra note 27, at 214. See generally European Commission (EC), Clinical Trials, 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/clinical-trials/. 
 69.  Thomas, supra note 27, at 214. According to an EMA-conduct analysis, “[a]lmost 62% of 
the patients in pivotal trials submitted in marketing-[authorization] applications (MAAs) to the 
European Medicines Agency between January 2005 and December 2011 were recruited outside of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland . . . .” EMA, European Medicines Agency Publishes 
Report on Patient Recruitment and Geographical Location of Clinical Trials (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2013/04/news_detail_00
1758.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5cl. This is significant because: 
Failure to recruit sufficient participants is a common reason for stopping a clinical trial. The 
struggle to find enough people is also one reason that companies are increasingly performing 
clinical trials in developing nations where infrastructure and [labor] is cheaper, and patients 
with limited resources are more willing to sign on to a trial as a way to access expensive 
drugs. 
Heidi Ledford, Therapeutic Success Stifles Medical Progress, 473 NATURE 433 (May 24, 2011), 
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110524/full/473433a.html.  
 70.  Press Release, EMA, European Medicines Agency Launches a New Version of EudraCT 
(“New Version of EudraCT”) (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl= 
pages/news_and_events/news/2013/10/news_detail_001918.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5c1. “The 
end goal is to move beyond having just basic protocol information in the registry, and toward a system 
that allows the public to track the end results of trials, including those with negative results.” 
Alexander Gaffney, New Updates to EMA Database Will Soon Make Summary Results of Clinical 
Trials Public, RAPS (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/ 
article/4177/new-updates-to-ema-database-will-soon-make-summary-results-of-clinical-trials-p.aspx. 
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it in line with ClinicalTrials.gov; this reflects the fact that the EMA and 
the NIH, which is in charge of ClinicalTrials.gov, are partners when it 
comes to promoting transparency.
71
 Also, the EMA requires even 
unapproved clinical trials of drugs to be posted within a year of 
completion, a move being considered in the U.S. Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking.
72
 These changes are important, especially since the EU CTR 
is “a primary registry in the WHO’s registry network;”
73
 however, like the 
U.S., there remain exemptions for certain trials including Phase I trials.
74
 
The impetus for EudraCT’s formation, the Clinical Trials Directive,
75
 
was intended to establish uniformity among clinical trials in EU member 
states and thereby increase the quality of research done in the EU.
76
 
Ultimately, the Directive created a byzantine bureaucracy that was 
difficult for clinical researchers to navigate.
77
 Due to these problems, “the 
number of clinical trials conducted in Europe between 2007 and 2011” fell 
by 25%.
78
  
 
 
See generally Roy Watson, EU Nations Approve Law to Overhaul Clinical Trials, 347 BMJ (2013), 
http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f7682. 
 71.  New Version of EudraCT, supra note 70.  
 72.  Zarin, supra note 45, at 178. See generally European Commission, Guidance on posting and 
publication of result-related information on clinical trials in relation to the implementation of Article 
57(2) of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Article 41(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006, Official 
Journal of the European Union (June 10, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
10/2012_302-03/2012_302-03_en.pdf. 
 73.  EU Clinical Trials Register, About the EU Clinical Trials Register, https://www.clinical 
trialsregister.eu/about.html. EMA, EU Clinical Trials Register information now available through 
WHO’s International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (2012), http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/ 
index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2012/03/news_detail_001477.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0580
04d5c1. 
 74.  Id. Trials outside the EU/EEA are only included if they form “part of a [pediatric] 
investigation plan (PIP), or . . . are sponsored by a marketing [authorization] holder . . . .” Id. This 
suggests that companies can get around the disclosure requirements if they conduct trials outside the 
EU/EEA. 
 75.  EudraCT, Purpose of EudraCT and the Clinical Trial Application, https://eudract.ema. 
europa.eu/help/content/eudract/purpose_cta_ov.htm. The requirements of the EU Directive seems to 
place at risk trials with non-commercial sponsors (public agencies and nonprofits) rather than those 
with commercial sponsors, because the directive has a “requirement that each trial have a single 
sponsor that . . . would be ‘legally liable for failures.’” Clinical Trials Face European Directive. 300 
SCI. 1353 (2003), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/300/5624/1353.2.full?sid=ed88db8a-a894-4272-
9c02-f8fb5c210c65.  
 76. Daniel Cressey, Europe Sets Out to Reform Its Clinical Trial Rules, 11 NATURE REVIEWS 
DRUG DISCOVERY 660 (2012), available at http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v11/n9/full/nrd3843. 
html. 
 77. Id. at 660. The structure of the current system creates unnecessary delay, costs, and 
paperwork. Id. 
 78. Id. at 660.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015] INCREASING TRANSPARENCY OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 533 
 
 
 
 
The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use and 
Repealing Directive 2001/20/EC (Clinical Trials Regulation Proposal) 
attempted to eliminate the Directive’s bureaucratic provisions.
79
 The 
proposal suggested replacing the directive with a regulation.
80
 Giving the 
new law the status of a regulation meant EU member states would no 
longer have to “integrate [it] into [their] own laws” and it would instead 
“automatically become law in all member states,” imposing the uniformity 
envisioned in but unrealized by the directive.
81
 The proposal further 
streamlined the process for conducting clinical trials by allowing sponsors 
of EU and EEA clinical trials to submit one application for multi-country 
trials rather than separate applications for each country.
82
 “One state 
would be designated as the ‘reference’ state . . . [to] lead a coordinated 
assessment.”
83
 
The EMA consulted various clinical-trial advisory groups on the 
proposed regulation,
84
 but the draft legislation did not escape criticism. 
Some researchers believed that the system should be operated by the EMA 
rather than the European Commission (EC) since the EMA has experience 
handling data requests.
85
 According to Mike Clarke, director of the All-
Ireland Hub for Trials Methodology Research at Queen’s University 
Belfast, neither the EMA or EC should assume full control; instead, 
 
 
 79. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, and Repealing Directive 
2001/20/EC (“Clinical Trials Regulation Proposal”) (2012), 16, http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/ 
clinicaltrials/2012_07/proposal/2012_07_proposal_en.pdf.  
 80.  Christina Reith et al., Randomized Clinical Trials—Removing Unnecessary Obstacles, 369 
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1061, 1061–62 (2013), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsb1300760 
#t=article. The proposal the European Commission issued in July 2012 does not address some 
problems: “[I]ts changes are directed chiefly toward expediting trial initiation [approval processes],” 
and “there is still inappropriate emphasis on safety assessments that rely on reports of individual 
adverse events . . .” Id. at 1062. 
 81.  Cressey, supra note 76, at 660.  
 82.  Id. at 660. A single submission portal for multinational trials would benefit, in particular, 
researchers of rare conditions. Id.  
 83.  Id. at 660. This particular provision has been criticized because it allows “trial sponsors to 
choose which member state they want to lead the assessment” and “[allows] the reference member 
state . . . to decide everything itself.” Id. Such a system may put a heavy burden on the reference state 
and does not foster scientific discussion between member states. Id. at 660–61. 
 84.  News and Press Release Archive, European Medicines Agency Publishes Final Advice from 
Clinical-Trial Advisory Groups, EUR. MED. AGENCY (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.ema.europa.eu/ 
ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2013/04/news_detail_001778.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac
058004d5c1.  
 85.  Cressey, supra note 76, at 660. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
534 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:521 
 
 
 
 
“[t]here should be a mix of academics, nonacademics, and regulators 
[assessing data requests] . . . .”
86
 
The European Commission’s proposed regulation was criticized for not 
explicitly mentioning ethics committees, instead providing that 
“applications should be evaluated by ‘a reasonable number of persons who 
collectively have the necessary qualifications and experience.’”
87
 Leaving 
the provision as-is would permit researchers to “shop around for loose 
oversight.”
88
 The loosely worded phrasing particularly concerned 
“Germany, where ethics committees play a powerful role in reviewing trial 
applications.”
89
  
In May 2013, the proposal overcame a major obstacle when it was 
approved by the European Parliament Environment, Public Health, and 
Food Safety (ENVI) Committee.
90
 The ENVI Committee considered 
various transparency amendments to the proposed Clinical Trial 
Regulation.
91
 A controversial amendment stated that the data in CSRs 
“should not be considered commercially confidential once a marketing 
[authorization] has been granted or the decision-making process on an 
application for a marketing [authorization] has been completed.”
92
 
Another amendment that drew considerable scrutiny required the 
 
 
 86.  Tania Rabesandratana, Drug Watchdog Ponders How to Open Clinical Trial Data Vault, 
339 SCI. 1369, 1370 (2013), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/339/6126/1369.full?sid=ed88db8a-
a894-4272-9c02-f8fb5c210c65. This would be the ideal situation. In reality, “[c]ompanies must share 
their data with regulatory agencies such as [the] EMA or [the] FDA, but they aren’t obliged to publish 
them in a journal . . . [S]ome negative trials never see the light of day . . . [T]here can be discrepancies 
between CSRs and published papers . . . .” Id. at 1369. 
 87.  Gretchen Vogel & Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Europe Debates Ethics Reviews, Data Release, 
339 SCI 1024 (2013), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/339/6123/1024.full?sid=ed88db8a-a894-
4272-9c02-f8fb5c210c65. The ethics committee is the EU equivalent to IRBs in the U.S. Eve M. 
Brunts et al., The International Clinical Trials Roadmap: Steering Clear of Legal and Practical 
Roadblocks, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 6 (2012). According to the EU Directive, only one opinion 
governs in an EU country even if multiple opinions are provided, which differs from U.S. policy. Id. at 
7. 
 88.  Vogel & Couzin-Frankel, supra note 87, at 1024.  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Bloomberg BNA, EU Legislation to Overhaul Regulation of Clinical Drug Trials Clears 
Key Hurdle, 12 MED. RES. L. & POL’Y REP. 373 (2013). 
 91.  AllTrials, Briefing on Transparency Amendments to the Clinical Trials Regulation 
(“Transparency Amendments”) (2013), http://www.alltrials.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Briefing-
for-Clinical-Trial-Reg-Dec-2013.pdf. See also European Parliament, ENVI, Draft Report on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on clinical trials on 
medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC (COM(2012)0369—C7-
0194/2012—2012/0192(COD)) (ENVI Draft Report) (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&reference=PE-504.236&format=PDF&language=EN&secondRef=01.  
 92. Transparency Amendments, supra note 91, at 5. 
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publication of CSRs within thirty days of marketing authorization.
93
 
Possible loopholes were considered in amendments that required “data 
from the clinical trial(s) [to] be submitted . . . even if incomplete”
94
 and 
explicitly mentioned previously missing language: ethics committees.
95
 
These amendments were criticized by the pharmaceutical industry.
96
 In 
particular, the amendment denying CCI protection to CSRs was of concern 
to Big Pharma.  
V. RELEASING CLINICAL STUDY REPORTS INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
In the transparency debate, access to CSRs is a major issue.
97
 CSRs 
contain useful data, including adverse events and mortality rates, which is 
rarely published.
98
 When drug manufacturers submit NDAs to the FDA in 
the U.S., they are required to submit CSRs and participant-level data.
99
  
The EMA “does not routinely request individual participant data or 
clinical study reports [CSRs]”
100
 and receives CSRs when drug companies 
“apply for licences to sell their products.”
101
 Though Regulation 
726/2004/EC requires that the EMA release documents it receives to the 
 
 
 93. Id. at 7. Non-compliant sponsors will face financial penalties. Id. at 7–8. 
 94. Id. at 14. 
 95. ENVI Draft Report, supra note 91, at 9. 
 96. Press Release, EFPIA, Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Information (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.efpia.eu/mediaroom/94/21/EFPIA-Press-Release-on-Responsible-Sharing-of-Clinical-Trial-
Information. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Association (EFPIA) asserted, 
“Several of the amendments supported by the European Parliament committee will jeopardize patient 
privacy, the integrity of regulatory systems and incentives for investment in biomedical research in 
Europe.” David Holmes, Transparency Battle Resurfaces as EU Trial Revamp Wraps Up, 19 NATURE 
MEDICINE 797, (2013), http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v19/n7/full/nm0713-797.html. 
 97.  Daniel Cressey, Secrets of Trial Data Revealed, 502 NATURE 154, 154 (2013), 
http://www.nature.com/news/secrets-of-trial-data-revealed-1.13913. 
 98.  Id. at 155. When Wiesler and her team conducted a comparison study of information in 
CSRs and publicly available information, they found “complete information was available for 86% of 
these in the CSRs, but only for 39% in the publicly available information.” Id. For outcomes related to 
harm, more information was found in CSRs as well. Id. See generally Beate Wieseler et al., 
Completeness of Reporting of Patient-Relevant Clinical Trial Outcomes: Comparison of Unpublished 
Clinical Study Reports with Publicly Available Data, PLOS MED (2013), http://www.plos 
medicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001526.  
 99.  Doshi et al., supra note 32. “The FDA has long treated participant-level data . . . as 
confidential commercial information” but is currently considering changes in its policy. Mello et al., 
supra note 15, at 1652. See Availability of Masked and De-identified Non-Summary Safety Request 
for Comments, 78 Fed. Reg. R 33421, (May 29, 2013) (FDA Request for Comment), available at, 
https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-13083.  
 100.  Doshi et al., supra note 32. 
 101.  Cressey, supra note 97, at 154. 
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public, it contains an exception for CCI (extending to CSRs)
102
 and the 
information provided in European Public Assessment Reports (EPARs), 
published in accordance with Regulation 726/2004/EC,
103
 is “written 
under the supervision of the company concerned.”
104
  
Relying on the CCI exception, the EMA did not “release any original 
document that the manufacturer submits for the approval process” until 
2010.
105
 In 2010, a lawsuit was initiated when the EMA refused to release 
clinical trial data, including CSRs, to Nordic Cochrane Centre 
researchers.
106
 The researchers appealed to the European Ombudsman, 
who ordered that the CSRs be released.
107
 The FDA also disclosed trial 
data after being sued by Public Citizen; researchers can obtain CSRs 
through freedom of information requests though it is a lengthy process and 
CCI is often not released.
108
 
 
 
 102.  Lincoln Tsang et al., New Paradigm for Transparency Practice for Greater Openness and 
Accountability in the Pharmaceutical Sector in Europe, 8 LSLR 1245, 2 (2014). “Regulation 
1049/2001/EC (Public Access Regulation) confers an express legal right to access documents held by 
European institutions” (with an exception for CCI). Id. “Regulation 726/2004/EC . . . requires that the 
Public Access Regulation should be applied to documents held by the EMA” (including explanations 
for its recommendations in EPARs). Id.  
 103.  Id. EMA, European Public Assessment Reports, European Medicines Agency, http://www. 
ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=/pages/medicines/landing/epar_search.jsp&murl=menus/medicines
/medicines.jsp.  
 104.  Silvio Garattini & Vittorio Bertele, How Can We Regulate Medicines Better? 335 BMJ 804 
(2007); See also Silvio Garattini &Vittorio Bertele, Europe’s Opportunity to Open Up Drug 
Regulation, 340 BMJ 842 (2010). Likewise, the FDA allows drug manufacturers to “draft the 
Summary Basis of Approval.” Aaron S. Kesselheim &Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws and 
Secrecy in Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
483 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/483.full.html. Also, the FDA allows drug 
manufacturers to write the labels (package inserts) for drugs. Lisa M. Schwartz & Steve Woloshin, 
Lost in Transmission—FDA Drug Information that Never Reaches Clinicians, 361 N. ENGL. J. MED. 
1717, 1717, 1720 (2009). “In many cases information [on harms gleaned from trial results] gets lost 
between FDA review and the approved label.” Id. at 1717. Such arrangements, which limit regulators 
to mere assessment, give drug manufacturers a great degree of discretion over release of trial data. 
 105.  Garattini and Bertele, Europe’s Opportunity to Open Up Drug Regulation, supra note 104, 
at 842. Tracy Hampton, European Drug Agency Under Fire: Critics Charge that Trial Data are too 
Inaccessible, 306 JAMA 593–95 (2011).  
 106.  Peter Gøtzsche & Anders Jørgensen, Opening Up Data at the European Medicines Agency, 
342 BMJ (2011). Gøtzsche and Jørgensen do note that CSRs do not contain any proprietary 
information. Id. 
[CSRs] and trial protocols represent the last phase of drug development . . . [o]ther companies 
could hardly use them as a basis for developing similar drugs. In fact, unpublished trial data 
are generally less positive than published ones, and competitors would therefore be less likely 
to start drug development if they had access to the unpublished results.  
Id.  
 107.  Hampton, supra note 105, at 593. According to the European Ombudsman ruling in 2010, 
“there were neither commercial data nor confidential patient data in [CSRs].” DeFrancesco, supra note 
37, at 529. 
 108. Hampton, supra note 105, at 594. Peter Doshi and Tom Jefferson, Clinical Study Reports of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/9
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The outcomes of the recent cases signal a shift in international policy 
toward increased transparency but is merely the tip of the iceberg for 
AllTrials, which been demanding an even higher level of data release 
including publication of full CSRs
109
 and publication of retrospective 
trials.
110
 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (EFPIA) is not amenable to AllTrials demands, particularly 
regarding CSR publication,
111
 and the industry has indicated that the 
EMA, which is rolling out a CSR publication policy, has not implemented 
sufficient safeguards for protecting the CCI contained in CSRs.
112
  
Also, the industry steadfastly maintains such a policy benefits 
competitors.
113
 Specifically, the industry has expressed concern that 
releasing this data makes CCI publicly available and results in 
freeriding.
114
 Still, such data should be made accessible to some degree 
because these investments are also supported by academic studies that rely 
on public funding.
115
 
The EMA policy of publishing CSRs resulted in lawsuits by two 
biotechnology companies, AbbVie and InterMune.
116
 These companies 
claimed “releasing [CSRs] would compromise ‘CCI’ that would give their 
 
 
Randomised Controlled Trials: An Exploratory Review Of Previously Confidential Industry Reports, 3 
BMJ (2013), http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/2/e002496.full#ref-31. 
 109.  AllTrials, All Trials Registered. All Results Reported (2013), at 6, http://www.alltrials.net/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/What-does-all-trials-registered-and-reported-mean.pdf.  
 110.  Id. at 2. 
 111.  Cressey, supra note 97, at 155. Richard Bergström, the director-general of the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), states, “[I]n their current state, 
CSRs are fundamentally unsuitable for publication.” Id.  
 112.  Id. at 155. EFPIA insists on redaction of CSRs but the EMA has required only that 
information be “‘de-identified’ and released only for bona fide research purposes.” Id.  
 113.  Rabesandratana, supra note 86, at 1369. Bergström says the EFPIA’s concerns about 
confidentiality are legitimate: “Out of 457 requests for data EMA received between November 2010 
and 2012, only 38 came from academics, whereas a majority came from drug companies, lawyers, and 
consultants.” Id. at 1370.  
 114.  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA). Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data 
Sharing (“Principles”) (2013), 4 http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMAPrinciplesFor 
ResponsibleClinicalTrialDataSharing.pdf. 
 115.  Garattini & Bertele, Europe’s Opportunity to Open Up Drug Regulation, supra note 107, at 
842. John Castellani, president and CEO of PhRMA, claims, “No government or academic institution 
has the resources or multidisciplinary expertise to conduct the clinical trials needed to develop the new 
medicines patients need.” John Castellani, Are clinical trial data shared sufficiently today? Yes, 347 
BMJ (2013) http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f1881.  
 116.  Hester Plumridge, Proposed Law Would Require More Drug-Trial Transparency, WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303802104579449160147006896. 
See also Phillip Broadwith, Clinical Trial Data Release Blocked by Companies, ROYAL SOCIETY OF 
CHEMISTRY (2013), http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2013/05/clinical-trial-data-release-blocked-
abbvie-intermune. 
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competitors an unfair advantage.”
117
 In April 2013, the two 
pharmaceutical companies gained a temporary victory when the lower 
court ruled in their favor and prevented data release by the EMA.
118
 The 
Superior European Court of Justice overturned the lower court’s ruling in 
November 2013.
119
 These lawsuits “direct[ly] challenge . . . the EMA’s 
policy of making clinical trial data more accessible.”
120
  
In the same year of the AbbVie and InterMune lawsuits, the 
pharmaceutical industry on both sides of the Atlantic—the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and EFPIA—took on a 
leadership role in promoting transparency and vowed to increase access to 
clinical trial information in the joint Principles for Responsible Clinical 
Data Sharing which took effect in 2014;
121
 however, the industry only 
agreed to release synopses of CSRs, not full CSRs.
122
 The Principles state 
that each company has the right to redact information from CSRs 
including CCI.
123
 No discussion of off-label use and retrospective trials 
appears in the Principles.
124
 
 
 
 117.  Broadwith, supra note 116.  
 118.  Peter Mansell, EMA Stalls on Data-Disclosure Policy, PHARMATIMES (2013), 
http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/13-12-19/EMA_stalls_on_data-disclosure_policy.aspx. 
 119.  Id. Court of Justice of the European Union, Order of the Vice-President of the Court, (2013). 
See EMA v. AbbVie, Case C-389/13 P(R), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text= 
&docid=145282&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=877340. 
See also EMA v. Intermune, Case C-390/13 P(R), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. 
jsf?text=&docid=145281&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8776
83. The Court of Justice of the European Union determined that the General Court had “failed to 
establish with sufficient weight that the disclosure of commercially confidential information . . . would 
result in ‘serious and reparable harm’ to the companies.” Mansell, supra note 118. 
 120.  Broadwith, supra note 116. Peter Doshi states, “If AbbVie and InterMune win their cases, 
there is a real chance that EMA’s revolution in data transparency will come to an abrupt end, returning 
us to the old status quo of data secrecy.” All Trials Registered, Medical Researchers Denied Clinical 
Trial Information, European Medicines’ Regulator Forced to Withhold Trial Documents (2013), 
http://www.alltrials.net/news/medical-researchers-denied-clinical-trial-information/. 
 121.  Peter Mansell, Industry’s Joint Principles on Data-Sharing Take Effect, PHARMATIMES 
(2014), http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/14-01-02/Industry_s_joint_principles_on_data-sharing_ 
take_effect.aspx. See also Principles, supra note 114. 
 122.  Principles, supra note 114, at 2. The Principles state:  
[B]iopharmaceutical companies will make publicly available, at a minimum, the synopses of 
clinical study reports (CSRs) for clinical trials in patients submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), European Medicines Agency (EMA) . . . Companies will make this 
information available . . . through appropriate redaction . . . [C]ompanies will evaluate 
requests for full CSRs. . . .  
Id.  
 123.  Id. at 5.  
 124.  A Roadmap for Sharing Clinical Trial Data, Vital Transformation (2013), 10, 
http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/efpia%20event%2027%20august%2013%20report.pdf. 
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Also, the industry drafted the Principles so that they control data 
release, a move mirrored in the Biotechnology Industry Organization 
(BIO)’s Principles on Data Sharing released afterward.
125
 Clearly the 
pharmaceutical industry prefers a “system of self-regulation” rather than 
the “open data transparency regime” contemplated in the EMA’s 
proposal.
126
 
The proposal, which promised to undercut trial sponsors control of 
clinical trial data, was approved by the European Parliament in April 
2014; Regulation (EU) No 536/2014, to be applied beginning in 2016, 
mandates registration of clinical trials and submission of summary 
results.
127
 The Regulation creates a single submission system, sets up 
scientific and ethical review,
128
 and mandates submission of CSRs 
“(thirty) days after the marketing authorization has been granted (or 
refused or withdrawn).”
129
 That said, it has drawbacks as it makes it easier 
for trial sponsors to continue off-label use.
130
 
 
 
 125.  DeFrancesco, supra note 37, at 533. See also Alexander Gaffney, BIO, Following PhRMA 
and EFPIA, Releases Clinical Trial Data Transparency Plan, RAPS (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.raps.org/regulatoryDetail.aspx?id=18376.  
 126.  Vital Transformation, supra note 124, at 3. The EMA is already planning to “systematically 
release the clinical study reports relating [to] all drugs given a marketing [authorization].” Id. at 3. The 
EMA’s stance is that “there is no commercial confidential information in clinical study reports of 
approved drugs” despite industry claims that “even if the products are patented, information on know-
how and trade secrets in CSRs will allow competitors to cut development times.” Id. at 6. 
 127.  Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC Text 
with EEA relevance (“Clinical Trial Regulation”), Official Journal of the European Union, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1401366187088&uri=OJ:JOL_2014_158_R_0001. The 
following transparency measures were agreed upon in 2013:  
A publicly accessible EU database, set up and run by EMA, containing: . . . [a] summary of 
results for all trials . . . Clinical Study Reports for all trials used in a marketing [authorization] 
request, whether it is approved, rejected or withdrawn[;] [a] statement that Clinical Study 
Reports should . . . not be considered commercially confidential[;] [and] [f]ines to be imposed 
by Member States for non-compliance . . .  
AllTrials, Clinical Trials Regulation in Europe, 2013, http://www.alltrials.net/news/clinical-trials-
regulation-europe-breaking-news/. See also Lincoln Tsang et al., supra note 102. For more 
information, see Viviana Giannuzzi et al., Clinical Trial Application: What Will Change With the New 
Regulation? SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS (2015). 
 128. BEUC, New European Clinical Trials Regulation: A Major Advance in Transparency, to be 
Confirmed (2014), 1, 2, http://www.beuc.org/publications/beuc-x-2014-068_ipa_new_eu_clinical_ 
trials_regulation-joint_letter.pdf. 
 129.  Tsang et al., supra note 102.  
 130.  BEUC, supra note 128, at 2. “. . . [T]his new regulation considers certain clinical trials in 
which a drug is used outside its [authorized] indications (off-label use) as ‘low-intervention’ trials 
which. . . are subject to less stringent regulation.” Id. The absence of “a mooted national indemnity 
[program], in which low-risk trials would have been insured by each member state” is another 
problem. Daniel Cressey, Overhaul Complete for EU Clinical Trials, NATURE, 2014, 
http://www.nature.com/news/overhaul-complete-for-eu-clinical-trials-1.15339. “This could have saved 
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The EMA decided to go a step further than U.S. transparency 
legislation (which only requires summary results) by publishing CSRs 
contained in marketing authorization applications starting from January 
2015.
131
 This impact of this policy stretches beyond Europe as non-
European manufacturers must comply “if they want their products to be 
marketed in the [EU].”132 
Though the Regulation promised transparency measures unprecedented 
in scope, it was not as far-reaching as anticipated as it reinforced the 
pharmaceutical industry’s hold on clinical trial data by imposing “Terms 
of Use” (TOU) and “Redaction Principles” on researchers who seek access 
to the data.
133
 The restrictions on data release may be attributed, in part, to 
the AbbVie and Intermune lawsuits, even though both lawsuits were 
withdrawn in 2014 after the EMA decided to permit redaction of CCI.
134
 
As in the U.S., regulators take into consideration the commercial 
interests of drug companies, which places trial sponsors in a position of 
controlling data access.
135
 In January 2015, the EMA defended its 
decision, stating that there was no “overriding public interest” that 
 
 
individual researchers from having to obtain their own insurance, which can be expensive.” Id. 
 131.  Press Release, EMA, Publication of Clinical Reports, 2014, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/ 
index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2014/10/news_detail_002181.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0580
04d5c1.  
 132. Alison Abbott, European Medicines Agency Set to Publish Clinical-trial Reports, NATURE 
(2014), http://www.nature.com/news/european-medicines-agency-set-to-publish-clinical-trial-reports-
1.15410. 
 133.  EMA, European Medicines Agency Policy on Publication of Clinical Data for Medicinal 
Products for Human Use (2014), http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/ 
2014/10/WC500174796.pdf. The EMA’s proposed policy included the following provisions: “[CSRs] 
would only be available for on-screen viewing . . . [;] [s]ubstantial parts of the reports could be 
redacted . . . [;] [and] [t]rial sponsors could redact their own [CSRs].” AllTrials, Has the EMA Made a 
Backroom Deal With Pharma Over Transparency (2014), http://www.alltrials.net/news/has-the-ema-
made-a-backroom-deal-with-pharma-over-transparency/. See also European Ombudsman, 
Ombudsman Concerned About Change of Policy at Medicines Agency as Regards Clinical Trial Data 
Transparency, Press Release No. 13/2014, http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/ 
en/54348/html.bookmark. When its proposed policy faced criticism, the EMA approved an 
amendment that allows “the public to download, save and print the trial data for academic and non-
commercial research purposes.” Alexander Gaffney, In Landmark Decision, EMA Adopts Clinical 
Trials Transparency Plan, RAPS (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2014/ 
10/02/20472/In-Landmark-Decision-EMA-Adopts-Clinical-Trials-Transparency-Plan/#sthash.TEUdlJQl. 
dpuf. 
 134.  Stephanie Bodoni, AbbVie Drops EU Court Bid to Block Clinical-Trial Data Release, 
BLOOMBERG (2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-03/abbvie-drops-eu-court-bid-to-block-
clinical-trial-data-release.html. See also Ben Adams, Intermune Drops EMA Lawsuit Over Data 
Release, PHARMAFILE (2014), http://www.pharmafile.com/news/187640/intermune-drops-ema-lawsuit-
over-data-release.  
 135. Ian Bushfield, The EMA Takes Backward Step in Move Toward Transparency, THE PHARM. 
J. (2014), http://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/opinion/comment/the-european-medicines-agency-
still-has-a-way-to-go-towards-clinical-trial-transparency/20067402.article. 
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justified complete information release.
136 
Also, the EMA asserted the right 
to redact information that is in the process of development and further 
explained that information redacted in a CSR does not infinitely maintain 
CCI status and may be released at a later time.
137
 
VI. PROPOSED MODELS FOR ACCESS TO CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 
The need to share information publicly to further science and promote 
public health must be balanced with the need to protect proprietary 
information. The question is: how much transparency is enough? 
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are often disinclined to 
include Phase I drug trial data, which are “exploratory . . . or ‘hypothesis-
generating’.”
138
 They claim making Phase 1 trials publicly accessible 
would probably not result in benefits for patients.
139
 “[A]round [eighty 
percent] of [drug trials] fail at this stage” and Phase I trials use healthy 
individuals to obtain safety data rather than testing for efficacy on sick 
patients.
140
 According to these companies, registering early-stage trials 
could place sensitive information at risk.
141
 
Biotechnology companies also worry that data sharing may stall 
innovation by deterring potential investors;
142
 however, the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors will benefit from releasing data 
about Phase 1 failures as it would “eliminat[e] the duplication of dead-end 
 
 
 136. EMA, Letter to Ombudsman (2015), 7, 9, 10, http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/ 
document_library/Other/2015/02/WC500182064.pdf. Limitations on access and redaction is allowed 
to protect personal data and CCI “unless there is an overriding public interest.” EMA, Public 
consultation on application of transparency rules of EU Clinical Trial Regulation (2015), 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2015/01/news_detail_00
2253.jsp. See generally Daniel Strech & Jasper Littmann, Lack of Proportionality. Seven 
Specifications of Public Interest that Override Post-approval Commercial Interests on Limited Access 
to Clinical Data, 13 TRIALS (2012). 
 137. EMA, EMA Explains its Redaction Rules (2015), http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp? 
curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2015/02/news_detail_002263.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5c1. 
 138.  Aaron Bouchie, Clinical Trial Data: To Disclose or Not to Disclose?, 24 NATURE BIOTECH 
9, 1058 (2006), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v24/n9/full/nbt0906-1058.html. 
 139.  Id. at 1059. It is true that “early phase 1 trials often present more risk to research subjects 
and less or no possibility of individual benefit.” Levin & Palmer, supra note 7, at 1579. Therefore, 
IRBs must ensure that research subjects do not take on too much risk for the sake of “promoting 
clinical research and motivation.” Id. 
 140.  Bouchie, supra note 138, at 1059. 
 141.  Id. at 1058. 
 142. Id. at 1060. It is crucial to share information to foster scientific advances and protect CCI to 
encourage the development of innovative products but the difficulty lies in determining how to satisfy 
the seemingly incompatible objectives and distinguishing how much information should be disclosed. 
Id. 
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studies” and grow the knowledge base of the drug industry faster.
143
 
Merrill Goozner of Washington DC’s Center for Science in the Public 
Interest states, “Competition in business is understandable, but science 
doesn’t work that way. Failures advance the field.”
144
 
Notwithstanding the public health benefit, the industry insists trial data 
disclosure creates a “risk of jeopardizing the privacy of patients”
145
 and 
has even garnered patient support to lobby against transparency initiatives, 
particularly the EMA’s proposal for CSR release.146 Contrary to industry 
concerns, access to full data sets (including patient-level data) will make 
the process of developing and researching drugs more efficient.
147
 Hans-
Georg Eichler, an EMA official, explains that release of clinical trial data 
will create a “level playing field” as long as the appropriate precautions 
are taken, including patient data deidentification, data-sharing agreements, 
and protective measures for proprietary data.
148
 Any data-sharing 
arrangement should also “treat all qualified data requesters and trial 
sponsors evenhandedly.”
149
  
Such an arrangement might take the form of a “learned intermediary” 
model.
150
 This model allows a learned intermediary to control and impose 
 
 
 143.  Id. at 1060. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Eichler et al., supra note 8, at 1578. The laws protecting personal data in the EU tend to be 
more encompassing than those in the U.S. Eve M. Brunts et al., supra note 87, at 23. “[P]ersonal data 
[a term used by the EU] is defined more broadly than PHI under HIPAA, as EU Directive 95/46/EC 
defines personal data to include any information relating to a natural person who is identified or 
identifiable.” Id. 
 146. Ian Sample, Big Pharma Mobilising Patients in Battle Over Drug Trials Data, GUARDIAN 
(July 21, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/21/big-pharma-secret-drugs-trials 
 147.  See Eichler et al., supra note 8. Eichler and his colleagues predict  
 [A]ccess to the full data sets of completed studies will lead to improvements in the design 
and analysis of subsequent trials . . . [L]essons from past trials about the heterogeneity of 
treatment effects . . . will streamline drug development . . . [W]ider access to patient-level 
data will allow sponsors to present more robust comparative-effectiveness information about 
their product soon after licensing . . . [Transparency will prevent] repetition of trials and 
projects that are doomed from the outset . . . . 
Id. at 1577–78. For further discussion, see Sabine Azor, et al., Will the EU Clinical Trials Regulation 
Support the Innovative Industry in Bringing New Medicines Faster to Patients? 27 PHARM MED 75–82 
(2013). 
 148. Eichler et al., supra note 8. 
 149. Mello et al., supra note 15, at 1654. See also An-Wen Chan, Access to Clinical Trial Data, 
342 BMJ (2011).  
 150.  Mello et al., supra note 15, at 1656. Mello also discusses the “pure open-access model” and 
the “database-query model.” Id. at 1655–56. Harlan Krumholz and Joseph Ross propose a model in 
which an “external coordinating organization . . . contracts with the pharmaceutical or medical device 
manufacturer, which agrees to provide access to all of its [relevant] data . . . [and two] qualified groups 
to conduct independent reviews of the data . . . .” Harlan Krumholz and Joseph Ross, A Model for 
Dissemination and Independent Analysis of Industry Data, 306 JAMA 1593–94, 2011, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015] INCREASING TRANSPARENCY OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 543 
 
 
 
 
conditions on data release.
151
 The entity would ideally not have conflicts 
of interest and have the necessary expertise to assess data requests.
152
 
This is similar to the EMA’s proposed three-category system of data 
release and includes some of the safeguards mentioned by Eichler.
153
 
Category 1 data (CCI) is not to be released into the public domain; 
Category 2 data (i.e., data “without protection of personal data (PPD)”) 
“will be available [for download] from the [EMA’s] website.”
154
 Category 
3 data (i.e., data “with PPD Concerns”), which includes CSRs, is only 
released upon “appropriate de-identification” and implementation of 
“controlled access.”
155
 
An alternative is the “sponsor-review” model, which grants the trial 
sponsor the ultimate authority over whether to grant requests and how 
much information to release with oversight by an independent board.
156
 
This is the model favored by the pharmaceutical industry, as seen in 
PhRMA-EFPIA’s Principles, which establishes a review board with non-
company-affiliated members to review researchers’ requests.
157
 This 
model puts in place safeguards for patient-level data and addresses the 
danger of patient re-identification through “data mining.”
158
 
 
 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1104485. Medtronic and Yale University are 
currently implementing this model. See generally Yale School of Medicine, Centers for Outcomes 
Research and Evaluation (CORE), Yale University Open Data Access (YODA) Project, http://yoda. 
yale.edu/policies-procedures-guide-external-investigator-access-clinical-trial-data. Like Medtronic, 
Johnson & Johnson agreed to share its trial data. Katie Thomas, Johnson & Johnson Will Make 
Clinical Data Available to Outside Researchers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/01/15/business/johnson-johnson-to-make-clinical-data-available-to-outside-researchers.html. 
 151.  Mello et al., supra note 16, at 1656.  
 152.  Id. Perhaps a “body [should] be established at the European level (a Data Access Review 
Board), which is independent from any of the stakeholders . . .” Rita Banzi et al., Fostering EMA’s 
Transparency Policy, 25 EUR. J. INTERN. MED. 681, 683 (2014). 
 153.  EMA, Publication and Access to Clinical Trial Data Draft (EMA/240810/2013) (“CT Data 
Draft”) (2013), http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2013/06/WC50014 
4730.pdf. However, the EMA is not necessarily the independent entity envisioned as it has conflict of 
interest issues. For Overview of Comments Received on Publication of EMA/240810/2013, see 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Overview_of_comments/2014/09/WC5001
74224.pdf. 
 154.  CT Data Draft, supra note 153, at 4.  
 155.  Id. at 5. Researchers must “identify themselves, . . . agree to do only specified studies, . . . 
not share data or try to identify patients. . . and to make results public within a year.” DeFrancesco, 
supra note 37, at 533.  
 156.  Mello et al., supra note 16, at 1656. The obvious flaw in this system is that trial sponsors 
have all the control over release of data, which would not necessarily engender public trust. Id. See 
also Zosia Kmietowicz, Roche Says It Will Not Relinquish Control Over Access to Clinical Trial Data, 
346 BMJ (2013), http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f1374. 
 157.  Principles, supra note 114, at 1. 
 158.  Id. at 4. The Principles state, “Any patient-level data that is shared will be anonymized to 
protect personally identifiable information. Companies will not be required to provide access to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
544 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:521 
 
 
 
 
Some drug companies are implementing their own “sponsor-review” 
models.
159
 As of 2013, five drugmakers—Boehringer Ingelheim, 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Roche, Sanofi, and ViiV Healthcare—are 
participating in an online database called Clinical Study Data Request to 
provide researchers access to “anonymized, patient-level clinical trial data 
under a voluntary data-sharing plan.”160 GSK requires researchers use data 
only for specified research purposes and sign a contract to that effect; 
Roche and Pfizer have implemented analogous policies.
161
 In 2014, other 
pharmaceutical companies – Eli Lilly, Bayer, and Bristol Myers Squibb 
(BMS)—also agreed to provide access to their trial data.162  
The opening of drug company vaults is a step in the right direction, but 
drug companies have been pushing to be “information gatekeepers” and 
their commitment to openness contains caveats.
163
 “[GSK], Roche, and 
Pfizer all largely exclude trials that tested off-label use of their drugs,” 
which comprises about “[one] fifth of prescription drug use . . . in the 
[U.S.]”
164
 If companies impose their own conditions, “the metaphor for 
the end state of ‘data transparency’ could easily be a maze.”
165
  
 
 
patient-level data, if there is a reasonable likelihood that individual patients could be re-identified.” Id. 
at 1. 
 159.  Perry Nisen & Frank Rockhold, Access to Patient-Level Data from GlaxoSmithKline 
Clinical Trials, 369 N. ENGL. J. MED. 475–78 (2013), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/ 
NEJMsr1302541.  
 160.  Michael Fitzhugh, Drugmakers Launch Data-Sharing Site, THE BURRILL REPORT (2014), 
http://www.burrillreport.com/article-drugmakers_launch_data_sharing_site.html. AllTrials has been 
instrumental in bringing about data-sharing sites like ClinicalStudyDataRequest.com. Id. Though the 
five companies have pledged disclosure, study sponsors are not willing to disclose all data. “Most 
sponsors are excepting clinical studies of rare diseases or single center studies from their data.” Id. 
 161.  Nisen & Rockhold, supra note 159, at 477. GSK is releasing data to researchers after their 
research proposals are reviewed by an independent review panel, which will “comprise external 
experts appointed by GlaxoSmithKline.” Id. at 476. Doshi et al., supra note 14.  
 162.  Thomas Sullivan, Clinical Trial Transparency Update: Eli Lilly, Bayer, Boehringer, and 
BMS Join Pharmaceutical Companies Sharing Patient-Level Clinical Trial Data, POLICY AND 
MEDICINE (2014), http://www.policymed.com/2014/06/clinical-trial-transparency-update-eli-lilly-
bayer-boehringer-and-bms-join-pharmaceutical-companies-sharing-patient-level.html. Eli Lilly and 
Bayer will be using ClinicalStudyDataRequest.com but BMS will be providing data access separately. 
Id. 
 163.  Data Sharing Will Pay Dividends, 505 NATURE 131 (Jan. 9 2014), http://www.nature. 
com/news/data-sharing-will-pay-dividends-1.14468. 
 164.  Doshi et al., supra note 14. See also David C. Radley et al. Off-label Prescribing Among 
Office-Based Physicians. 166 JAMA 9, 1021–26 (2006), http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article. 
aspx?articleid=410250. 
 165.  Doshi et al., supra note 14. 
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VII. TWIN GOALS OF PROTECTING CCI AND PROMOTING PUBLIC HEALTH 
(OR IS IT JUST ONE?) 
Sharing clinical trials data is necessary to foster scientific advances and 
to promote public health. This means ensuring that trials do not remain 
unpublished years after they are conducted and ensuring trials that are 
published do not display a bias toward positive results.
166
  
Open access to clinical trial results may create risks including possible 
“misinterpretation of clinical trials due to inappropriate analyses.”
167
 This 
risk is mitigated since patients can discuss information with physicians, 
who have the expertise to put the information in context.
168
 
Releasing all clinical trial information, without limitation, is not the 
answer but neither is redacting all such information. Safety and efficacy 
data should be released for public health reasons.
169
 “Information such as 
pharmacologic or chemical data about a product’s composition and 
stability” should be protected if manufacturers can show competitive 
harm.
170
 However, protection for CCI should not be indefinite.
171
 Also, 
patient-level data should be de-identified before being published.
172
  
Mere disclosure of clinical trials data is not enough. Instead, as 
Matthew Herder argues, regulatory decisions “whether positive (i.e. 
product approvals) or negative (i.e. abandoned products, product refusals, 
and withdrawals)” should be published openly.173 The EMA is slowly 
implementing measures that offer more transparency including publishing 
 
 
 166.  Doshi et al., supra note 32. See generally UK Parliament, Public Accounts Committee, Lack 
of Consensus Over How Well Tamiflu Actually Works (2014), http://www.parliament.uk/business/ 
committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/news/tamiflu-report/. See also 
Joseph S. Ross et al., Publication of NIH funded trials registered in ClinicalTrials.gov: cross sectional 
analysis, 344 BMJ (2012), http://www.bmj.com/content/344/bmj.d7292. 
 167.  Eichler et al., supra note 8, at 1578. 
 168.  Lemmens & Telfer, supra note 12, at 79. “The relative risk of misinterpretation is . . . less 
threatening to appropriate patient care than selective publication of positive results and hiding of 
negative data.” Id.  
 169.  Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 104, at 489.  
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Alastair J.J. Wood, Progress and Deficiencies in the Registration of Clinical Trials, 360 N. 
ENGL. J. MED. 824, 829 (2009). Wood suggests that the two-year time period should be the standard 
for Phase 1 trials and the FDA’s “‘negative’ decisions on the [NDA]s.” Id. It is also important to 
distinguish which data should be protected. Data that constitutes CCI is “information relating to trade 
secrets (formulas, programmes, process, molecules, etc.), not just ambiguous ‘commercial 
confidences.’” Rita Banzi et al., supra note 152, at 682.  
 172.  DeFrancesco, supra note 37, at 534. In 2013, the British Medical Journal started requiring 
release of de-identified data. BMJ, Open Data, http://www.bmj.com/open-data.  
 173.  Matthew Herder, Toward a Jurisprudence of Drug Regulation, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 244, 
244 (2014).  
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negative and positive decisions, contrasting the U.S. which “selectively 
publish[es] their decisions.”174 The EMA also provides “‘information 
about all refusals’ . . . and information pertaining to withdrawn 
applications” whereas the FDA provides more limited access.175 Though 
the FDA and EMA are making more data available, such as providing 
access to clinical trial summaries through Drugs@FDA and EPARs 
respectively, gleaning useful information from the summaries is another 
matter as “the content is not standardised, information deemed to be [CCI] 
is redacted [and] . . . many trials are not included in regulatory 
databases.”176 Therefore, the next step is to disseminate trial data in a 
manner that allows researchers and other relevant parties to make more 
efficient use of the data.  
 Regulators can start by increasing transparency for their decision-
making to enhance public trust.
177
 They can also solicit data from 
independent contractors to supplement or even replace industry conducted 
trials when determining whether to approve drugs.
178
 To reduce reliance 
on industry data, clinical trials can be financed through public funds.
179
 
While there is greater need for data transparency to protect public 
health, it is important to note that cooperation from drug companies, health 
care professionals, researchers, and regulators is key in achieving this 
goal. The recent changes in FDA and EMA regulations purport to foster 
information exchange and the two agencies are leading the way to the end 
goal of transparency, but there is a danger in overregulation, which may 
have the unintended effect in creating an environment “where [industry 
and researchers] can[not] collaborate without fear of sanction.”180 
Therefore, regulators should carefully weigh the following considerations: 
promotion of cooperation for the sake of scientific advances,
181
 deterrence 
 
 
 174.  Id. at 244. 
 175.  Id. at 246. The FDA has allowed advisory committees, comprised of non-FDA members, to 
participate in its deliberations. Id. at 245. However, Herder questions whether these committee 
members are disinterested. Id. at 250. 
 176. An-Wen Chan, Out of Sight but Not Out of Mind: How to Search for Unpublished Clinical 
Trial Evidence, 344 BMJ (2012), http://www.bmj.com/content/344/bmj.d8013. 
 177. Herder, supra note 173, at 249, 256.  
 178. Rita Banzi et al., supra note 152, at 683. Such data includes independently sponsored trials 
and unpublished results from the scientific community. Id. Dean Baker, supra note 17, at 11–14. 
 179. Dean Baker, supra note 17. Funding sources include cost reductions for drugs in the 
Medicare prescription drug plan and decreased pharmaceutical marketing expenditures. Id. at 11–14. 
There is a cost-savings component to publicly funded trials as it cuts downs on duplicative trials and 
kickbacks. Id. at 8. 
 180. Epstein, supra note 42.  
 181. Id. However, while communication and collaboration should be enabled, drug sponsors’ role 
in evaluating its own drugs should be minimized.  
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of non-reporting or misreporting of trial results, and the need for health 
professionals to have access to complete trial information (including 
adverse events) to ensure that patients do not suffer unnecessary harm.
182
 
Equally important as data transparency is “market transparency” or pricing 
regulation to ensure patient access to markets for drugs.
183
  
Though progress is slow, the FDA and EMA are working toward a 
common goal: increasing access to data pertaining to clinical drug trials in 
a way that ensures patient safety and allows for pharmaceutical 
innovation.
184
 These twin aims are not necessarily incompatible. 
Transparency of clinical trial data can be realized through enacting 
legislation to enforce comprehensive registration and standardize trial 
protocols; providing enforcement for trial registries on national and 
international levels; adopting policies that allow for release of CSRs and 
other relevant data; conducting independent testing of clinical trials; 
imposing greater oversight of studies funded or sponsored by 
 
 
 182. Tsang, supra note 102. Health care professionals are the intermediary between the scientific 
community and the patients. Patients consult health care professionals to figure out what clinical trial 
information means. Therefore, such information should be posted in online registries or made available 
through journals and CSRs. A parallel issue is ensuring health care professionals maintain 
independence in decision-making. In the U.S., the “Sunshine Act,” passed in 2010, requires drug 
manufacturers “to report payments or transfers of value made to U.S. physicians and teaching 
hospitals” on a website called Open Payments but there have been many “technical challenges.” Id. at 
4–5. European pharma decided to implement similar measures as the U.S. when they announced the 
“EFPIA Disclosure Code” in 2013. Id. at 4. In the EU, the law requires that health care professionals 
make decisions for patient care that are not “influenced by . . . financial inducements.” Id. at 2.  
 183.  Markus Hartmann and Florence Hartmann-Vareilles, Patient Protection and Access to 
Innovative Medicinal Products in the European Union, 42 DRUG INFORMATION JOURNAL 281, 289–90 
(2008). To achieve market transparency, it is critical to increase access to generic drugs, which are 
cheaper than their brand-name counterparts. Jessica Underwood, What the EU has that the U.S. Wants: 
An Analysis of Potential Regulatory Systems for Follow-Up Biologics in the U.S., 10 DEPAUL HEALTH 
CARE L. 420–21 (2007). As Donald Light observes, the exorbitant prices the pharmaceutical industry 
charges for its drugs is unreasonable. Michelle Llamas, Big Pharma Cashes in on Americans Paying 
Higher Prices for Prescription Drugs, Drug Watch (2014), http://www.drugwatch.com/2014/10/15/ 
americans-pay-higher-prices-prescription-drugs/. Even though drugs have high costs in the initial 
development phase, the “minor variations [on older drugs]” churned out later have much lower 
production costs but remain expensive for consumers. Id. Pharmaceutical companies continue to find 
new ways to fund drug development and maximize profits. Llewellyn Hinkes Jones, Stop Subsidizing 
Big Pharma, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/opinion/stop-
subsidizing-big-pharma.html?_r=0.  
 184. The FDA and EMA are collaborating and exchanging information on pharmacovigilance to 
ensure that drugs that reach the market are safe for consumers. FDA, FDA and European Medicines 
Agency Strengthen Collaboration in Pharmacovigilance Area, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm386372.htm. Pharmaceutical companies are working with 
regulators including the FDA and EMA to standardize clinical trial protocols and increase efficiency in 
drug development and delivery. Dalvir Gill, Re-inventing Clinical Trials Through Transcelerate, 13 
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY (2014), http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v13/n11/full/ 
nrd4437.html. 
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pharmaceutical companies; and implementing measures for accurate 
reporting of trial data, particularly safety and efficacy data, on the most 
popular medium of health information today.
185
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 185. Wood & Gariby, supra note 1, at 548. Compliance mechanisms (independent review boards 
and information gatekeepers) should be put into place to deter trial sponsors from circumventing 
mandated transparency requirements and regulatory measures. See infra Parts III, IV, and V.  
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